Personal diplomacy can ease tensions between Washington and Beijing. But domestic political pressures, military uncertainty and economic insecurity could undermine the stability their leaders are trying to build.
English translation of an opinion article originally published in Postimees.
Donald Trump and Xi Jinping’s meetings are becoming one of the most notable features of international politics in 2026. In September, they met for the second time this year. If the current relative warmth between the two leaders continues, they could meet twice more before the end of the year: at the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November and the G20 summit in Miami in December.
The symbolism of their latest meeting—such as Trump going to greet Xi at the aircraft steps—can certainly be seen as diplomatic theatre. Trump loves grand gestures, and Xi knows how to use them to his advantage. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that such meetings have no substantive value. Regular communication between the leaders of the world’s two most influential countries itself reduces the risk of miscalculation.
At the same time, Trump and Xi’s conspicuously good personal rapport should not be confused with stable US–China relations. The foundations of their confrontation have not disappeared. Indeed, in the years ahead, relations between Washington and Beijing may be shaken most severely not by their foreign policy disagreements, but by their respective domestic problems.
A strategic stalemate
US–China relations can currently best be described as a strategic stalemate. Both sides possess powerful economic weapons against the other, but neither can use them to their fullest extent without suffering severe losses itself.
China could restrict exports of rare earths and magnets, causing serious disruption to US industry. The effects would extend beyond electric vehicles and consumer electronics. Rare earths are also essential to America’s defence industry and the production of weapons systems.
The United States, in turn, has at least equally powerful sources of leverage: access to the most advanced semiconductors, the technology needed to manufacture them and the American market. Washington could further constrain Chinese companies’ technological development and restrict access for many Chinese goods to the world’s most important consumer market.
A full-scale economic war would therefore inflict enormous damage on both sides. It amounts to the possibility of a form of economic mutually assured destruction.
This interdependence has given rise to the cautious attempt at stabilisation seen in recent months. At their spring meeting, Trump and Xi agreed to establish dialogues on trade, investment and artificial intelligence. September brought more concrete steps, including an intention to reduce tariffs reciprocally on goods that are not strategically sensitive.
It was also telling that US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, usually a hardliner on China, attributed the progress directly to Trump and Xi’s good personal relationship.
There is, however, a downside. Trump’s conspicuous displays of respect give Xi a valuable domestic political victory at a time when China’s economy is under pressure and purges within the military leadership are raising questions about the stability of his power.
Political uncertainty in the United States
The first major domestic political risk to US–China relations is brewing in Washington.
Trump and Xi’s next meeting may take place after the US midterm elections in November. Their impact could be considerable. Trump’s popularity has declined, while voters’ dissatisfaction with the economy, inflation, the Iran war and the administration’s record on civil rights has grown.
If the Democrats win a majority in Congress, the remainder of Trump’s presidency will become far more politically difficult. Congress can block some presidential initiatives, launch investigations and force the administration increasingly onto the defensive at home.
At the same time, Republicans are looking increasingly towards the 2028 presidential election and, with it, the post-Trump era.
For Beijing, the question is therefore not only what can be agreed with Trump, but how long those agreements will last and whether they can provide the basis for a long-term strategic relationship.
Here lies the weakness of personalised diplomacy: the more the stabilisation of relations depends on Trump and Xi’s personal rapport, the less certain its survival beyond their time in office becomes.
Xi’s fourth term and the question of succession
In China, too, continuity of power is far less assured than it may appear from the outside.
Xi Jinping is preparing for an unprecedented fourth term as party leader next autumn. Public opposition to his rule is virtually non-existent in China, and Xi maintains an iron grip on the party, the state apparatus and the security structures.
That does not mean the system is free of risk.
Xi’s weakest point is the economy. China’s model in recent years—strongly prioritising exports, industrial policy and technological self-sufficiency—has helped the country strengthen its position in several strategic sectors. Yet much of the population has not benefited to the same extent.
Even more important is the question of the transfer of power.
There is currently no clearly identifiable successor to Xi on the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee. In systems centred on a single leader, the absence of an established succession process can prove a serious vulnerability.
In this sense, Washington and Beijing’s problems are something of a mirror image: both are dominated by an ageing leader, and in both it is unclear what the next transition of power will look like. Their political systems are entirely different, but from the perspective of strategic stability, the problem is similar.
The military as a source of uncertainty
A second notable parallel concerns relations between civilian authorities and the military.
In the United States, several senior military officers have been replaced under Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, and the administration’s relationship with the armed forces’ leadership has become more politicised. The deployment of the military in Washington and other cities has also generated controversy.
Added to this is a practical problem arising from the Iran war: the rapid depletion of stocks of long-range missiles and other munitions. If Washington also wants to maintain credible deterrence towards China, weapons stockpiles and defence-industrial production capacity become increasingly important.
In China, the picture is different but no more reassuring. The removal of Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli shows that Xi’s purges of the People’s Liberation Army are not solely about corruption. State media have also accused them of disloyalty and of building their own “factions”, raising questions about Xi’s control over the military.
It is difficult to give a definitive answer from the outside. But the public accusation of political disloyalty against officers of such seniority itself points to deeper tensions.
This matters for US–China strategic stability. In a crisis over Taiwan or the South China Sea, what counts is not only political leaders’ intentions, but also how reliably chains of command function, how much confidence the leadership has in the armed forces and how faithfully political orders are carried out.
Economic success no longer guarantees security
A third shared problem is growing economic insecurity.
Industrial strength, exports and technological leadership lie at the heart of Xi’s strategy. Electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy, semiconductors and artificial intelligence are intended to reduce China’s dependence on the West and secure its leading role in key technologies.
But this model has a social cost. Youth unemployment remains high, the social safety net is weak, and the property market downturn has hit households that invested much of their savings in housing particularly hard.
The issue is therefore not just economic growth, but expectations. For decades, a tacit social bargain, maintained under Communist Party pressure, rested on the promise that steadily improving living standards would compensate for limited political freedom. If that promise no longer convinces people, the regime’s legitimacy also comes under pressure.
The problems in the United States are different, but dissatisfaction with economic change is growing there too. Rapid advances in artificial intelligence are deepening fears of job losses, while the expansion of data centres is increasing electricity demand and intensifying disputes over energy costs and local resources.
These two very different economic models thus share a similar uncertainty: technological progress and economic growth no longer provide confidence that the next generation will enjoy a better life. Politically, that feeling may matter more than any individual economic indicator.
When domestic politics begins to drive foreign policy
Both Trump and Xi have used policies rooted in nationalism and populism to strengthen their power.
Trump’s “America First” and Xi’s “national rejuvenation” narratives differ ideologically, but partly serve the same purpose. Both emphasise that their country has suffered unfairly at the hands of outside forces and needs a strong leader to restore its rightful position.
Such politics helps explain domestic difficulties in terms of external competition. But it also creates a risk.
The greater Trump’s or Xi’s problems at home become, the stronger the temptation may be to use foreign policy as a tool for domestic political mobilisation. In the United States, this could mean a sudden hardening of anti-China rhetoric. In China, the pressure could manifest itself in more aggressive behaviour towards Taiwan or in other regional disputes.
Here lies the paradox of the current stabilisation in US–China relations. Trump and Xi’s personal relationship may indeed help avert crises and create room for agreements. Three or four summits in a single year would itself be a notable achievement.
Yet personal diplomacy does not resolve either country’s internal tensions. And the more foreign policy becomes a tool of domestic legitimacy, economic discontent or power struggles, the less the future of relations between the two countries depends on how well their presidents get along.
Perhaps a certain strategic balance has indeed emerged between Washington and Beijing: both are strong enough to inflict serious damage on the other, but too dependent on each other to choose an all-out confrontation deliberately.
The most dangerous moment may come when one of them begins to believe that, for domestic political reasons, it can no longer back down.
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