Before Donald Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing, Brussels, Paris and Berlin were preparing for the worst: fears that the world’s two great powers would begin shaping a new balance, leaving Europe on the sidelines.
Originally published in Postimees (Estonian): Šokki ei tulnud, aga Trump ja Xi lükkasid täiskäigule juba mõnda aega küpsenud protsessi
The greatest concern centred on three scenarios. First, the possibility of a broad trade deal at the cost of Europe’s economic marginalisation. Second, fears that Trump might make concessions to China on Taiwan in exchange for Beijing’s help on Iran. Third, concern that Washington could begin easing technological restrictions on China while still demanding a hard line from Europeans.
At first glance, the European Union might therefore breathe more easily. In reality, the outcome of the Xi-Trump meeting should be deeply unsettling for Europe. The summit revealed a shift in the global balance of power. In Beijing, it was clear that China increasingly senses its growing leverage and appears more convinced that America’s capacity to sustain a prolonged economic confrontation is weakening. For Europe, that is bad news.
The formal outcomes of the meeting were modest. The most concrete result was a commitment to establish a new US-China trade council aimed at preventing further escalation of economic tensions.
But in geopolitics, symbols and signals matter. Xi maintained composure and confidence, while Trump avoided direct confrontation. Trump described Xi as a “friend” and a “great leader”. Xi, meanwhile, spoke openly about American decline and reaffirmed China’s uncompromising position on Taiwan.
It was also notable that Xi offered Trump nothing concrete on Iran, despite Washington’s apparent hope for Chinese cooperation. Trump later expressed optimism, but no tangible commitments emerged.
For Europe, this is an important signal. Until recently, the West operated on the assumption that the United States could, when necessary, pressure China and rally allies around a coordinated response. The atmosphere in Beijing suggested something different: that China increasingly believes time is on its side.
A changing balance of power
This confidence has not emerged in a vacuum. Over the past year, China has demonstrated that it possesses genuine leverage over the United States and its partners. When the Trump administration raised tariffs, Beijing responded with restrictions on rare earth exports, rapidly triggering concern in both Washington and Europe. China understood that in several strategic sectors, the West depends on it more than it depends on the West.
The Xi-Trump summit reinforced this perception. Washington faces difficulties in restoring global tariffs following US court rulings, while discussions have already emerged around easing sector-specific trade restrictions. Beijing, for its part, warned that further protectionist measures would trigger retaliation and could destroy the fragile trade détente reached in Busan last year.
Europe takes a harder line
This creates an uncomfortable situation for Europe: the United States may move toward partial stabilisation with China just as Brussels prepares for a tougher course.
The European Commission is actively preparing new trade defence measures against China, particularly in chemicals, industrial manufacturing and high technology. Discussions are also underway regarding broader instruments designed to protect European markets from Chinese overcapacity and dumping.
European business circles are increasingly concerned that pressure from low-cost Chinese exports may intensify in the coming years. If China’s economy slows and domestic consumption remains weak, Beijing will likely redirect even more industrial output toward export markets.
The EU therefore faces a difficult political choice. If Washington itself moves toward reducing tensions with China, it will become significantly harder to rally member states behind a unified and assertive China policy.
Why should European companies bear the economic costs and restrictions if the United States is simultaneously seeking stabilisation? That question will become increasingly difficult in Brussels in the months ahead.
Beijing grows more confident toward Europe
Recent signals from Beijing toward Europe already suggest growing Chinese confidence. China has reacted aggressively to European industrial and cyber security measures. European companies have faced sanctions for supplying dual-use technologies to Taiwan. Beijing has also sharply criticised the European Commission’s investigation into Chinese security equipment manufacturer Nuctech.
As one European diplomat reportedly put it: “Americans are giving up. Now it is your turn.”
That may sound exaggerated, but it captures Beijing’s current mindset. China sees Western unity as weaker than before. Washington’s priorities are shifting. Internal EU divisions are deepening. Economic pressure is making a prolonged confrontation with China increasingly difficult politically.
This is precisely why Beijing believes it may now be able to pressure Europeans separately.
Europe increasingly stands alone
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Xi-Trump summit for Europe is the realisation that it can no longer automatically rely on strong transatlantic coordination on China.
Under Joe Biden, Washington actively pushed Europeans to restrict technology exports, reduce dependencies on China and strengthen investment screening. That often created frustration in Europe, but at least a coherent strategic framework existed.
Trump’s approach is different. For him, alliances are fundamentally transactional, and economic deals may outweigh geopolitical principles.
This means the EU may soon find itself making difficult strategic decisions on China without firm American backing. That would represent a genuinely new strategic reality.
Much of Europe’s economy remains deeply intertwined with China. Germany’s automotive sector depends heavily on Chinese markets. French luxury brands rely on Chinese consumers. Several southern European economies still seek Chinese investment. Meanwhile, eastern European states prefer a much tougher security approach.
Finding a unified European strategy becomes increasingly difficult. This may prove to be the summit’s most practical consequence for EU policy. Several member states are already pressing the Commission not to close channels of dialogue with Beijing entirely.
Recent discussions have intensified over whether the EU should proceed with an EU-China summit even if Xi Jinping does not personally attend and China is instead represented by Premier Li Qiang.
Only months ago, such an idea would have seemed politically problematic in Brussels. Today, it increasingly looks like pragmatic necessity.
The reason is simple: Europe does not want to escalate a trade conflict with China while simultaneously facing growing uncertainty in relations with the United States.
This does not mean abandoning de-risking or becoming softer toward Beijing. But several European capitals may begin seeking ways to stabilise tensions as full confrontation becomes increasingly costly.
Putin’s visit and the bigger picture
Putin’s visit to Beijing immediately after the Xi-Trump summit serves as an important reminder of the broader strategic context.
Its symbolism is unmistakable: reinforcing the continuing “no limits” partnership between China and Russia.
For Europe, this is an important warning. China can no longer be viewed solely through the lens of trade or technology. Relations with Beijing are increasingly inseparable from security questions, from Russia’s war in Ukraine to global supply chains and strategic dependencies.
A new geopolitical reality
The Xi-Trump summit did not produce a geopolitical shock. But it accelerated a process that has been visible for some time: the transformation of the global order toward a world in which America is no longer the uncontested economic and strategic leader. For Europe, that is an uncomfortable conclusion.
In the future, European interests may not fully align with either Washington or Beijing. The EU must learn to operate in an environment where both great powers increasingly use economics, technology and dependencies as geopolitical weapons.
Europe’s fate was not decided in Beijing. But the summit made one thing very clear: the world Europe must adapt to is changing rapidly. The EU’s central challenge is no longer simply containing China or managing relations with Beijing.
What makes the situation far more complex is that transatlantic unity on economic policy and China can no longer be taken for granted.
Europe must increasingly define its own strategy in a world where Washington’s and Brussels’ interests do not always align, and where America’s role in shaping a unified Western course is less certain than before.
For more analysis on China, global power shifts and Europe’s strategic position, read: Trump’s strategy and China’s advantage in the Iran war