This is an English translation of an opinion piece originally published in Postimees.
- Merz’s silence in the White House when Trump attacked Spain came across as politically uncomfortable.
- Targeting the economy of one EU member state would inevitably mean confrontation with the entire union.
- In the longer term, the danger lies in the normalization of America’s pressure policy.
The strikes by the United States and Israel against Iran have once again exposed Europe’s uncomfortable search for balance between security dependence, legal self-image, and internal fragmentation, writes Ambassador Clyde Kull in Postimees.
This situation can be viewed on three levels: political reactions, institutional dynamics, and the broader impact on European-American relations.
First level: initial political alignment
The immediate reaction from Paris, Berlin, and London was to align politically with Washington. The emphasis was clearly on Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and destabilizing role in the region. None of the three leaders publicly questioned the legality of the US-Israeli strikes under international law.
This silence was not accidental.
There is a clear calculation in European capitals: do not alienate Donald Trump at a time when Europe depends on the US military presence to support Ukraine and deter Russia. Public opposition could have undesirable consequences, as Europe currently lacks the military capability to quickly fill this gap.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has been particularly cautious. His approach has been to avoid public confrontation while seeking to maintain influence behind closed doors. This is a policy of damage control: Germany’s security depends on the US, while its export-driven economy is vulnerable to possible trade retaliation. Public confrontation would not seem rational for Berlin.
But this attitude comes at a price. The image of the German chancellor silently listening to Trump’s attacks in the White House leaves Europe with an impression of powerlessness. This is not just a question of optics; it affects Europe’s political self-confidence.
Second level: differentiation and the Spanish moment
Within a few days, however, a more nuanced position began to emerge in Europe.
French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized that Iran bears responsibility for regional instability, but added that the American and Israeli attacks are taking place outside the framework of international law and cannot be approved by France. This is a classic Parisian stance: maintaining transatlantic relations while protecting the rules-based world order.
Macron’s position cannot be said to be anti-American; rather, it emphasizes European autonomy.
He does not dispute the strategic goal—containing Iran—but questions the method.
Macron also expressed visible support for Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who has become Europe’s most vocal critic of military intervention.
Sánchez’s position is legally consistent: considering the Iranian regime unacceptable does not mean that military intervention outside international law should be accepted. Spain’s refusal to allow its bases to be used for offensive operations marked a clear line.
Donald Trump’s threat to cut off trade with Spain sounded politically powerful. In reality, however, such a step is complicated. Trade policy is the sole responsibility of the European Union. Targeting one member state would inevitably mean confrontation with the entire union. European Commission Vice-President Teresa Ribera has already noted that although the threats sound dramatic, their practical implementation is difficult to achieve economically and legally.
There is an important nuance here that is well understood in Brussels: Sánchez and the Spanish Socialists are influential in the Social Democratic faction of the European Parliament. Attacks on Sánchez will not facilitate the possible ratification of the EU-US trade agreement. On the contrary, they may make the Social Democrats’ stance more rigid. If Friedrich Merz and the European People’s Party want to push ahead with such an agreement, they need the support of the S&D.
Against this backdrop, Merz’s silence in the White House when Trump attacked Spain came across as politically uncomfortable. Iran is not Greenland, but the contrast in European solidarity was striking. When it comes to direct territorial pressure, the response is joint. When it comes to political and economic pressure, unity is fragile.
Third level: institutional fragmentation
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen referred to the need for a “credible transition” in Iran – a phrase that many interpreted as indirect openness to regime change. A day later, the foreign ministers of the member states did not support this line, and no common position could be formulated.
This reflects a simple fact: the common foreign and security policy is under the control of the member states and requires unanimous decision-making. The European Commission can send political signals, but it is the governments that shape the content.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, also avoided legal assessments, preferring cautious language. This was not accidental, but rather institutional caution in a situation where there is no consensus.
The defense clause and its limits
The crisis has also highlighted the practical weakness of the mutual assistance clause – Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. Despite drone attacks on facilities of European interest, no member state considered invoking it.
The reason is obvious: there is no operational doctrine, no common chain of command, and no integrated enforcement structure. The clause is a political declaration, not a functioning military mechanism.
In practice, Europe’s collective defense still relies on NATO and, therefore, on the United States. As long as this remains the case, European military independence will remain a political ambition.
Why is Europe fragmented?
The differences stem not only from political will, but also from deeper factors.
Firstly, there are differences in security threats. For Eastern European countries, Russia is a direct and existential threat. For Southern Europe, instability in the Middle East and migration pressure are the primary concerns.
Second, historical experiences and political culture play a role. Germany’s caution regarding the use of force is deeply rooted. Italian public opinion is skeptical of foreign operations. Spain emphasizes the central role of international law.
Thirdly, there is structural dependence. European countries depend on the nuclear umbrella, intelligence capabilities, and logistical support of the United States. These are not easily replaceable.
In addition, the European defense industry is fragmented, the procurement system is duplicative, and cooperation is slow. Integration is progressing, but slowly.
What next?
It can be assumed that, in the short term, the balancing rhetoric will continue. Efforts will be made to avoid an open rift with Washington. At the same time, there is no readiness for complete alignment.
In the medium to long term, the debate on strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities will intensify. The debate on the role of France’s nuclear capabilities in European security is also likely to intensify.
In the longer term, there is a risk that America’s pressure policy will become the norm. If commercial and political pressure is applied selectively against individual member states, this could undermine Europe’s internal cohesion.
Iran is not the main issue
Iran is the trigger for the current crisis, but not its central problem.
The real question is how the European Union can act in a situation where it needs security guarantees from the United States but has to take into account Washington’s political unpredictability.
Europe will not sever its ties with Washington. But it is not in complete agreement either. We are seeing a cautious alignment accompanied by legal discomfort and institutional fragmentation. This is not a temporary phenomenon, but reflects a deeper contradiction: the desire to be an independent political force while in reality being dependent on external military support.
This tension will not disappear with the easing of the Iran crisis. It is likely to intensify. And the longer the situation continues where Europe talks about acting independently but relies on American power at decisive moments, the more acute the question becomes: will Europe ever be able to take responsibility for its own security in a way that does not require quiet political self-censorship?
No press release or diplomatic statement can answer this question. The answer will emerge over the years – through defense capabilities, political will, and internal unity.
But one thing is clear at the moment: Europe’s dilemma has not disappeared. It has become more visible.
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