Originally published in Postimees on 5 September 2025. Clyde Kull analyses the shifting balance of power after the Tianjin SCO summit.
- Tianjin highlighted opportunities for cooperation between China, Russia and India.
- Trump’s tariffs accelerated India-China dialogue, despite tensions.
- The new world order is still not certain.
Donald Trump has always relished the role of global troublemaker. But his latest barrage of tariffs could have unintended consequences: forcing cooperation between previously rival nations, ambassador Clyde Kull writes.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin in early September was a living testament to this. The images that dominated the international media told the story better than any communiqué. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood side by side, smiling and shaking hands in a gesture that was more than just diplomatic choreography. They signaled that, under pressure from Washington, Asian powers were willing to experiment with new alliances – even if only temporary.
Donald Trump’s punitive 50 percent tariffs on India were a turning point. Washington justified the measures as a response to India’s continued imports of Russian oil. For Modi, however, the move confirmed that even a country that has been treated as a strategic partner for years can come under attack from Washington overnight. Delhi’s search for alternatives led Modi to Tianjin, his first trip to China in seven years.
Energy as a connecting link
Energy is the area where the intersection of these relations is most evident. For Moscow, it is a lifeline, for Beijing a negotiating weapon, and for Delhi a hedge against volatility.
The summit gave political approval to the long-awaited Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. The price issue remained unresolved – Beijing is demanding Russia’s domestic market prices, which is humiliating for Moscow. Yet the decision to move forward is already significant and shows how deeply dependent Russia is. If the pipeline is ever completed, Russia could cover up to 40 percent of China’s gas imports. For China, which has so far followed a path of energy diversification, this would mean a turning point and greater involvement. At the same time, however, this risk is mitigated by the rapid development of renewable energy.
India’s position is clear: oil purchases from Russia will continue. This is not just an economic decision, but also a political one. Surrendering to Washington would show Modi as a weak leader, which his electorate, which emphasizes national pride, would not forgive.
Energy is thus a common but strikingly unequal axis of the triangle: Russia is the dependent, China dictates the terms, and India seizes the opportunity.
India’s balancing move
It would be too simplistic to think that Modi’s visit to China signifies a radical departure from the US or a fall into Beijing’s embrace. For decades, the cornerstones of Indian diplomacy have been «strategic autonomy» and «multilateral engagement»: engaging with everyone but avoiding binding commitments. Trump’s tariffs may have accelerated dialogue with Beijing, but the principles have not changed.
The 2020 Galwan Valley border conflict, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed, is still fresh in the public memory. Trust in China is thinner than paper. It is no coincidence that Modi skipped Xi’s military parade after the Tianjin SCO meeting and flew straight to Tokyo – to strengthen ties with his Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners, which, in addition to India, include Japan, the US and Australia.
China remains India’s largest trading partner, whereas the trade balance with Beijing is negative – a deficit of more than 90 billion US dollars is a sensitive issue in India. But promises of economic reforms and the need for investment are forcing Modi to increasingly seek practical cooperation with Beijing. Modi’s message in Tianjin – India and China are «partners, not rivals» – was more a signal to Washington than a declaration of friendship: India has options.
The complex partnership between China and Russia
For Xi, the summit was an image-making victory. Hosting both Putin and Modi at the same time enabled to present China as the indispensable architect of a new world order. Slogans of multipolarity and «inclusive globalization» sounded like a counterpoint to US volatility.
Xi and Putin’s relationship has been heralded as an «unlimited partnership». The reality is more complicated. Russia’s growing dependence on the Chinese market is making the relationship increasingly unequal. In Central Asia, where Russia dominated for decades, China’s influence has grown and competition has intensified.
For Xi, Putin is a useful partner, a counterweight to the United States and an ally against Washington’s attempts to isolate Beijing. As long as Russia depends on China’s economic power, Moscow will remain loyal – on Beijing’s terms.
SCO: From chat room to a serious block?
Until now, the SCO has been seen in the West as a bureaucratic chat room. However, Tianjin hinted at a change.
With 10 permanent members and 16 observer states, the SCO now represents almost half the world’s population and a quarter of the world’s GDP. Xi’s call to take advantage of the bloc’s «mega-sized market» was not so much about direct trade deals as about portraying the SCO as a credible alternative to Western-led institutions. Putin emphasized this by highlighting the growing use of national currencies in mutual settlements, a step toward reducing the influence of the dollar.
True, internal contradictions are not going anywhere. India and Pakistan remain rivals, China and India compete in Asia, Russia and China in Central Asia. But the organization’s symbolic value and growing regional political capital can no longer be ignored, especially at a time when many countries in the Global South feel cornered by US protectionism.
Trump as an accidental architect
Larry Summers, former United States secretary of the treasury, put it bluntly: the US has managed to «unite its adversaries and divide its friends». Trump’s tariff war confirms this paradox. By simultaneously dealing a blow to India and China, he has created an incentive for both to find common ground that seemed unlikely just a few years ago.
The irony is obvious. Trump’s goal was to curb China’s rise and isolate Russia. Instead, he has deepened Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and accelerated Delhi’s dialogue with Xi.
The Global South factor
The Tianjin summit is also part of a broader shift. Over the past two decades, emerging economies have doubled their share of global GDP and their consumption capacity has grown dramatically. China and India together now account for nearly 18 percent of global consumption, up from 6.5 percent in 2000.
This means that the era of the «irreplaceability» of the American consumer market is over. New, growing markets in Asia and Africa offer alternatives. Trump’s tariffs have only accelerated this development, forcing countries to seek new export channels and create alternative financial mechanisms.
The expansion of BRICS, the SCO Development Bank, and the use of national currencies in settlements provide a framework for trade, investment, and financial cooperation outside Western systems. The Global South is not seeking confrontation with the US, but choices – and Trump’s policies are accelerating this search.
Europe’s dilemma
The European economy is still heavily dependent on the US market and the transatlantic alliance, but at the same time it is interested in accessing the Indian and Chinese markets.
European companies are already worried about losing ground in Asian markets as supply chains are reorganized. If India becomes more open to Chinese technology and infrastructure investment, the EU could find itself caught between US pressure and the lure of Asia’s expanding markets. The risk is not immediate exclusion but gradual marginalization.
Conclusion: The era of seeking balance has arrived
The Tianjin summit produced no binding agreements or dramatic realignments. Its real significance lies in the symbolic joint meeting of Xi, Modi and Putin. It showed that in a world where Washington uses tariffs and sanctions as weapons, even traditional rivals are considering new forms of cooperation.
This is not the birth of a new anti-Western bloc. India remains committed to strategic autonomy, Russia is weak and dependent, China prefers flexibility to global responsibility. But the willingness to appear together – and to discuss alternatives to the US-led order – is itself a profound change.
This is a painful lesson for the US: coercive trade diplomacy can bring short-term wins, but at the expense of long-term impact. For Europe, the message is equally sobering: in a multipolar world, it is no longer enough to simply follow Washington’s lead.
The era of balancing has begun. Tianjin was not its end point, but a reminder that the pull of the Global South is changing international politics – whether the West likes it or not.
Key takeaways:
- Trump’s tariffs push Asian powers toward cooperation.
- Energy links bind Russia, China and India in unequal ways.
- The SCO is emerging as a symbol of a multipolar world.
- Europe faces a strategic dilemma between the US and Asia.
- The era of balance and multipolarity has begun.
Read the original here: https://news.postimees.ee/8320856/clyde-kull-are-xi-modi-and-putin-really-planning-to-take-over-the-world
