- Both German and French policies are expected to become more inward-looking in the coming months.
- The EU is facing a number of major changes and Franco-German leadership would be crucial.
- There is still no coherent approach on how to respond to Washington’s likely disengagement from Europe.
Europe’s two leading superpowers are mired in domestic political drama at a time when the European Union is facing serious geopolitical challenges, writes Ambassador Clyde Kull in Postimees.
In France, President Macron is wrestling to form a governing coalition after snap elections created an unpredictable situation in which no party has an absolute majority in parliament.
Macron is reluctant to name a prime ministerial candidate from the left-wing alliance New Popular Front, which won the most seats in parliament. And while he will continue to meet with party leaders, it cannot be ruled out that Macron will manoeuvre to appoint someone from his own ranks rather than the left, which would undoubtedly anger the left.
Regardless of the outcome of this process, France faces difficult months ahead. Parliament will have to cut the budget by €10 billion to meet the EU Commission’s demands. This will be a considerable challenge for the new government.
The situation is equally grim in Germany, where the ruling coalition is increasingly losing popularity and the far-right Alternative forGermany (AfD) is on the rise in the polls. The AfD came second in the German European elections in June and is expected to win a record high number of votes in the three upcoming state elections in the former East Germany.
The rise of the AfD puts Chancellor Scholz under further pressure at a time when he is facing considerable tensions within his own coalition over budget negotiations. While some of Scholz’s social democrats and the Greens are calling for more public investment, pro-market Free Democrats and the chancellor himself are strongly opposed to any spending that would mean abandoning Germany’s “debt brake” rule.
Bad news for Europe
As a result, the French and German leaders are in a similar situation: both have to push through a budget despite the political deadlock. Both countries face a unique but similarly complex process to do so, with domestic political consequences, but more importantly, these problems will have repercussions for the rest of Europe.
In both France and Germany, budget negotiations require national governments to set priorities and make compromises. As the governments in both countries face increased political pressure, particularly from the far right, it is likely that they will seek to reassure the public with increased domestic spending. As Germany’s preliminary budget negotiations show, this decision could come at the direct expense of Ukraine, which would send a signal to Russia that the allies’ oft-repeated “as long as it takes” is just a figure of speech.
Given the influence of France and Germany, the decision to reduce aid to Kiev could also cause doubts in other European countries at a time when war fatigue is beginning to show in some of them. The need for France and Germany to tighten their budgets could lead to longer-term challenges for European defence, including common defence projects.
In addition, the policies of both countries are expected to become more inward-looking in the coming months. Both Scholz and Macron will have to make considerable efforts to hold together the governing coalition – Germany faces federal elections next year as well as elections in several Länder. As a result, both leaders are likely to focus mainly on domestic policy rather than an ambitious European agenda.
This shift comes at a bad time for the EU, which is facing major challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine, the green transition and possible enlargement, which would also likely require institutional reform. For all these challenges, Franco-German leadership would normally be crucial.
The EU Commission has in recent years begun to play a more prominent leadership role in advancing the European agenda. But many critical decisions, such as on foreign policy or treaty reform, remain a national competence. Historically, the Franco-German agreement on such issues has paved the way for the involvement of other Member States. Although the two countries often have different visions, a compromise becomes more acceptable to others when their positions are reconciled. Given that both leaders will have to devote a significant part of their time next year to reaching compromises at national level, it seems highly unlikely that either of them will have the political energy to achieve these often difficult transnational agreements.
The legitimacy of Macron’s and Scholz’s leadership has also become questionable. Not only have both their parties been weakened by domestic gambling, but both suffered significant losses in the last European elections. EU leadership has also become more diverse in recent years, with Polish Prime Minister Tusk or Italian Prime Minister Meloni, for example, speaking out on issues of importance to the EU, such as defence and migration.
Long-term consequences
A weakened France and a weakened Germany – and a jointly weakened Franco-German axis – are not just a short-term challenge for Europe. Especially if such a development takes place at a time of major strategic changes in the United States.
Regardless of the outcome of the US presidential elections in November, there is no doubt that Washington’s strategic priorities are above all in the Pacific, and more specifically in competition with China. As a consequence, US foreign policy is likely to soon see Europe and engagement with Europe as a means rather than an end in itself, with the aim of counterbalancing the threat posed by China’s rise.
Europeans need to prepare for a situation in which Europe is not only de-emphasised in US foreign policy, but in which the US puts increasing pressure on Europeans to adopt the same approach towards China in return for European security involvement.
The EU does not yet have a coherent approach on how to respond to Washington’s likely disengagement from Europe. It is true that European countries have significantly increased their individual and collective defence spending since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU is also set to play a more prominent role in shaping strategic thinking in the region. And schemes such as the Strategic Compass and new defence industry legislation – such as the law on support for ammunition procurement or the European Defence Industrial Strategy – are driving this shift.
But there is no strategic vision of how the EU should respond to increased competition from the US and China. Nor is there a plan in case EU interests should diverge from Washington’s. For the moment, everyone’s own bilateral relations with Beijing and Washington seem to be seen as more important. Such an approach is unsustainable in the future, given the common interest.
With foreign policy still being shaped by Member States, France and Germany’s leadership in taking these discussions forward at EU level remains critical. But Scholes and Macron both face significant domestic policy challenges that threaten their own political futures. Reflecting on the geopolitical future of the EU is unlikely to be the number one priority, however necessary it may be.